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Abstract
The collection of personal information by smart
toys causes various privacy concerns. The use of
personal information has also been subject to
regulatory acts by different governments. For these
reasons, smart toy manufacturers need to develop
effective privacy controls. However, designing usable
privacy controls remains a challenge. In this paper, we
sought to identify the main security vulnerabilities
involved with smart toys that are related to usability and
may impact users' privacy. To this end, we performed a
security analysis and usability heuristic evaluations.
After identifying current vulnerabilities, we create a list
of design recommendations aiming at enhancing both
the usability and privacy of smart toy privacy controls.
We also suggest a revised severity scale to help to
prioritize the design solutions.

1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an ecosystem that is
transforming all devices to build a smart society [1].
These smart devices have benefited consumers in many
ways, such as smart thermostats placed in the home and
wearable technology to monitor health and fitness [2].
IoT has also influenced children's toys that have
transformed from simple, stuff toys to Internetconnected toys that can also communicate and interact
with children [3], [4]. For example, Hello Barbie, an
Internet-connected toy from ToyTalk.com and Mattel,
operates when the button in the belt buckle is pressed,
and it connects the Hello Barbie doll to the Cloud server
of ToyTalk.com [5]. CogniToys Dino is another smart
toy powered by IBM Watson technology that is Cloudconnected and operates through the Internet. Dino
works simply as when the child asks questions by voice,
and Dino that is connected to the Internet listens and
replies according to the question [6]. These devices can
provide personalized based services to users by
collecting data from user contexts such as location, time,
and weather. The Elemental Path has described the
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functionality of CogniToys Dino as that it gathers child
personal behavior and preferences such as favorite
color, favorite games and provides service according to
their age-appropriate content to interact with them [7].
However, the collection and use of such sensitive
information are subject to regulatory acts, such as the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
from the United States Federal Trade Commission [8],
and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
from the European Union [9]. Also, users (or their legal
guardians) may not consent to such devices collecting
their personal information. Therefore, smart toy
manufacturers are required to implement effective
privacy controls to protect the collected information [4,
10, 11].
We have seen in recent years, several privacy
violations or data breaches, such as the VTech breach
that resulted in the disclosure of about 6 million children
records [12]. Table 1 presents some well-known
children's privacy violations due to ineffective security
control or privacy malpractice and their respective
related fines, in US dollars, levied by United States
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against the company
violating children's privacy.
Company

Violation

Year

Fine

ByteDance

COPPA compliance failure
with their TikTok app.

2019

$5.7
million

Oath

COPPA violation - Online
advertising.

2018

$5.0
million

inMobi

COPPA violation - location
tracking.

2016

$950,000

Table 1. Some Known Privacy Violation and Fines.

Although the FTC continues to levy hefty fines against
companies violating COPPA, adopting effective privacy
controls remains a challenge in the field [13]. To address
this challenge, we sought to review the main security
vulnerabilities of some current smart toys and their
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resulting user privacy concerns and impact. For this
reason, we identified security and usability problems
that remain present in popular smart toy applications,
causing vulnerabilities. To overcome these problems,
we present a list of recommendations for further
improvements in smart toy technologies.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the background on smart toys, information
security, privacy, and usability. Section 3 describes the
method of this study. Section 4 presents the case studies
we performed to reach our goal. Section 5 presents
recommendations for future designs of smart toy
privacy controls. Finally, Section 6 concludes our paper
and discusses future works.

2. Background
As shown by Albuquerque et al. [14], although
privacy is difficult to define, it relates to the right of
people to keep their personal information a secret or not.
It generally refers to one's desire to set who has access
to them. This is closely related to the concept of
confidentiality, which is defined by ISO 27000 as the
"property that information is not made available or
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or
processes." In this context, confidentiality is an
extension of privacy but focuses on how the user's
private information is managed to prevent unauthorized
users from gaining access. Essential security controls
established in ISO 27001 required to maintain
confidentiality can be considered as very important in
establishing and protecting privacy.
The literature has diverse approaches focusing on
the privacy and security issues of IoT devices, among
which smart toys have an increasing interest. Hung et al.
identified privacy requirements at the legislative level
and privacy laws that are applicable to children's smart
toys. They showed that, as the physical safety of a child
is mandatory, a framework was needed to attain the
privacy of the child by reducing the sensitive data
collection and its retention. This included a parent or
guardian to control their child-sensitive data [15].
Meanwhile, Rafferty et al. proposed a conceptual model
of privacy rule for smart toys, IoT devices, and mobile
services. In the model, parents and legal guardians are
owners of child information, which is in accordance
with a data privacy act known as COPPA (Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act). COPPA allows parents
and legal guardians to monitor and regulate the
information that is gathered online. Parents must give
their consent to rules (access rules) about sharing their
child's personal data [10].
McReynolds et al. conducted a survey on parents
and children who play with internet-enabled toys. They
emphasize the survey on worries that parents and their

children have when playing with smart toys, observing
that many children were not even aware that their
conversations are being recorded. They have pointed out
that the toy designers should design toys in a way that
alerts children before recording instead of the red
blinking light that is not spotted by children. They have
also suggested to toy manufacturers not to keep the
recordings of child conversations for a long time and
delete them in a week or allow parents to delete the
recorded conversations permanently. Their study also
found that many parents require parental control over
the toy, such as the function to turn off the Internet on
the toy or to manage its responses to children's questions
[4]. Dhanhani et al. suggested that toy manufacturers
should consider forensic measures while designing
internet-enabled toys [16]. Rafferty presented an access
control model and framework intended to protect the
location of children playing with Internet-connected
toys [17].
Finally, Holloway et al. [18] show the potential
benefits of smart toys (e.g., enthusiasm and enjoyment).
Meanwhile, they outline various emerging privacy and
security issues found in smart toys. According to them,
ToyTalk (responsible for the Hello Barbie) argues that
it is not possible to prevent children from providing
personal information. Nevertheless, ToyTalk's policies
state that if the company comes across any recordings
with personal information, the company will delete it. In
this sense, Holloway et al. argue that the security
protection of smart toys depends on parental choice over
parental control. Also, they argue that this may involve
other security breaches.

2.1. Privacy and Smart Toys
As per Hung et al. [3], a smart toy is:
a device consisting of a physical toy component that
connects to one or more toy computing services to
facilitate gameplay in the Cloud through networking
and sensory technologies to enhance the functionality
of a traditional toy.

Smart toys establish two-way communication with the
child [10]. The smart toy vendor is able to provide
personalized based services through the collection of
data from users' contexts. Smart toys often gather the
childs' personal behavior and preferences, such as
favorite color, favorite game, and in order to provide
age-appropriate content for the child to interact with the
toy. By interacting with smart toys, the toy can gather
personalized information about the child. In most cases,
the guardian and the child both have no idea of the
concept of privacy and how to protect it. Consequently,
children reveal their personal information while playing
with these toys without the awareness of the dangers of
such information revel [10]. The personal information
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used and collected by these connected devices can be
hacked; as such, sparking various security and privacy
concerns. The concerns become exponential with
respect to sensitive personal information about children,
as all interactions of a child with the Internet-enabled
toy are stored somewhere else on a remote server [10].
Because of the challenging nature of privacy and
connected devices, some manufacturers of smart toys
may not design security and privacy as a top
requirement.
The literature shows that some smart toys available
on the market remain with security threats. Mattel Hello
Barbie, My friend Cayla and i-Que robot are examples
of such toys [19]. For instance, parental control is
needed for the proper functioning and more security of
the toy [10, 16]. Hello Barbie is designed to be the
child's best friend, talking and sharing secrets [18, 20].
The doll has built-in features that record every
conversation between child and Barbie and stores this
conversation in a cloud database. This database is also
shared with the child's parents, which gives the
impression that parents (or legal guardians) have
absolute control over the conversations. Hello, Barbie
application also includes a feature to share the
recordings of children's conversations with the toy on
social networks. As a matter of fact, there is a possible
threat to sharing the collected data with third parties.
This indicates that in both ways, Hello Barbie is not
keeping a secret [18, 20].
Holloway and Green [18] discuss that security
specialists can easily get access to the names of all WiFi networks to which the toy connects, the user account
details, and even the sound files of pre-recorded
responses of Barbie conversations when the doll is not
connected to the Cloud. In 2015, VTech Electronics
LLC, a company that develops connected tablets for
children, suffered a data breach of almost 6 million
children and 4 million parents all over the world [12].
The information included parents' and child names,
birthdate, pictures, gender, and account password.
VTech failed to protect the Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) of parents and their children that they
have collected for the use of their connected tablets [21,
32]. However, these kinds of data breaches elevate
concerns about the privacy of users' data; and rightful
question whether these smart toy manufacturers are
considerably doing enough to implement security
controls necessary to address privacy risks of the
collected consumer data.
According to the privacy policy of CogniToys Dino
[22], the Personal Information provided by parents
about themselves and their children may include name,
home address, contact information, current location,
email address. As one can see, this information is
privacy sensitive and sufficient to identify users. The

policies state that information is only used for the
internal purpose, to give a personalized experience to
users, and that the toy company is not going to reveal
customers' collected Personal Information to third
parties without the consent of users, except as described
in their Privacy Policy. This may allow the company to
disclose some information to third parties without
identifying the identity of the parent or child. For
example, to attest that smart toy companies are
considering the privacy of children's information in their
care, a Ranking Member, Nelson, of the US Senate,
requested the security and privacy policies from few
famous connected devices and toy companies. He also
requested information about how they collect, use, and
secure user personal information. The companies in
question provided him with the report that reveals the
smart toys gather much information, including the
Personal Identifiable Information of parents and their
children. The companies also showed that they have
security policies for user data protection applied.
However, the security vulnerabilities in Fisher-Price
Smart Toy Bear uncovered that they were unsuccessful
in protecting and securing customer data. These
incidents elevated questions of whether smart toy
manufacturing companies are considering the security
of consumer data as their top priority [21].
Due to privacy concerns related to smart toys,
studies have analyzed the security of these devices in
order to identify vulnerabilities. Somerset Recon Inc
[23] analyzed the security of Hello Barbie, one of the
first smart toys to become popular in the market. They
have identified security vulnerabilities that can be
considered as privacy vulnerabilities due to its impact
on privacy, as we present in Table 2. A similar security
analysis is made available by Pen Test Partners [24] on
the Dino smart toy, another popular smart toy in the
market. We also included these analyses in Table 2.
#

Information Security
Vulnerabilities

Privacy Impact

1

"Weak passwords" [23].

This vulnerability will
allow attackers to brute
force user account
credentials remotely and
infiltrate victim user
accounts. However, we
have found that this issue
has been resolved now.

2

"No Password Brute Force
Protections" [23].

This vulnerability allows
attackers to brute force user
mobile app account
passwords remotely and
infiltrate victim user
accounts. An attacker is
also able to gain access to
audio conversations of the
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toy with a child as it is
accessible through user
accounts. However, as we
observed, it has been
resolved now.
3

4

5

"Hello Barbie device uses
unencrypted Wi-Fi network"
[23].

This vulnerability allows
attackers to perform a man
in the middle attack by
joining open and
unencrypted Barbie's Wi-Fi
network. However, this WiFi connection is only
available in pairing mode
by pressing two buttons on
the device. There is a
possibility that the child
might unknowingly press
these two buttons and open
the Wi-Fi device network.
We observed that this
vulnerability had not been
resolved by now.

"Hello Barbie device does
not require unique
authentication to modify the
configuration of the device"
[23].

This vulnerability could
cause the toy to use an
account created by the
attacker, and in this way, an
attacker can listen to audio
conversations. An attacker
could also gain access to the
user account credentials
from the toy web
application and insert
malicious audio
conversation files to the
victim user account [23].
However, we observed that
it had been resolved now.

"Audio files can be accessed
without authentication" [23].

An attacker can get the
URL of an audio
conversation that is stored
on CloudFront without
authentication, and the file
is accessible even if the user
changes the account
password. The problem
faced by an attacker while
accessing those audio
conversation files would be
that URL paths to all audio
files are random [23]. We
observed that this security
vulnerability had not been
resolved yet.

Cross-Site Scripting: The
web Interface of the toy,
which is available over WiFi and is used in
configuration mode, is
vulnerable to a few security
issues. This includes
persistent Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) attack [24].

The web page does not
perform input validation or
sanitization while entering
the SSID, and by submitting
the script such as
"<script>alert (1)
</script>" [31], the code
gets executed and displays
"1". An attacker could
exploit this vulnerability

and perform Persistent XSS
and Cross-Site Forgery
Request attacks. As we
observed, this security
vulnerability has not been
resolved yet.
6

Use of HTTP for
transferring sensitive
information: The web
interface of the toy is used to
add or modify Network
SSID. The SSIDs that are in
use or to set a new SSID
with different priority levels
are displayed on the web
interface. The users can
select any security type and
enter a password to connect
to SSIDs. This web page
uses an unsecured
connection HTTP, i.e.,
http://192.xxx.x.x, and it
could be easily accessed by
the hacker [24].

When the toy is in
configuration mode, a
hacker can perform
malicious activities such as
Man in the Middle (MITM)
by sniffing the traffic
between the user and the
toy and stealing any
sensitive information.
However, it would be better
to set login credentials to
enter the web interface of
the toy. As observed in our
study, this security
vulnerability has not been
resolved yet.

Table 2. Smart toy Vulnerabilities and Privacy Impact

Although security issues are important to identify
privacy vulnerabilities, studies have shown that
usability also plays an important role in enhancing users'
efficacy, efficiency, and satisfaction with different
privacy controls [12, 25]. For this reason, in this paper,
we conduct an empirical case study to evaluate the
usability of examples of smart toys aiming to identify
privacy vulnerabilities.
2.1.1. Usable security issues in smart toys
Recent studies have shown that usability may play an
important
role
in
enabling
laypeople
(as
parents/guardians) to effective use of privacy controls
[12], [21]. The usability concept is defined by the
ISO/TR 9241 as [26] as
the extent to which a system, product, or service can
be used by specified users to achieve specified goals
with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a
specified context of use.
We describe a deeper relationship between usability and

privacy controls by first considering the definition of
usability. In regards to the usability definition, and
considering the context of privacy controls, "specified
goals" (part of usability definition) are control
objectives "(...) to be achieved as a result of
implementing controls" [27]. Because privacy controls
are provided and configured by means of user interfaces,
poor usability of such interfaces (e.g., because of poor
effectiveness) may be seen as a weakness of the privacy
control process and can be exploited by a threat. In other
words, and considering that the "weakness of an asset or
control (3.14) that can be exploited by one or more
threats (3.74)" is an information security vulnerability,
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poor usability of privacy controls may be seen as
information security vulnerabilities [27, 28].
As the range of privacy threats increases, laypeople
are often required to make security decisions [29, 41] by
understanding privacy concepts or policies. However,
privacy policies are usually long and complex [30], and
usable tools for laypeople are still needed [12, 21]. To
design usable tools of any kind, usability evaluations are
essential [31]. These methods can be distinguished
between those that depend on end-users to be performed
(use-based evaluations) and those that depend on
inspectors to be performed (inspection-based
evaluations) [42]. Among inspections, heuristic
evaluation (HE) is popular and allows practitioners to
diagnose usability problems on the interface [33].

3. Methods
In this study, we sought to identify the main security
vulnerabilities involved in the smart toys' context that
have an impact on users' privacy. For this reason, we
complemented the findings from a literature overview
(shown in Section 2.1) with additional security analysis
and two empirical usability inspections. The Security
analysis stage is a security analysis of one smart toy
technology to confirm the findings from the literature
and, potentially, identify new issues. This stage can also
confirm whether the set of security vulnerabilities is
saturated, and no new vulnerabilities are found. The
usability evaluation stage comprises the evaluation of
two smart toy privacy controls. This is performed to
identify human vulnerabilities involved with smart toy
privacy controls that are due to usability aspects. To this
end, we performed heuristic evaluations. Heuristic
evaluations can identify information security
vulnerabilities by means of employing usable security
heuristics as criteria for the judgment [28]. Heuristic
evaluation returns situations when users might face
usability problems when setting their privacy controls.
This may lead to privacy risks. Our goal is to identify
usable privacy issues that can help the literature to
understand how to improve the interface of smart toys'
privacy controls.

and because the literature has previous security analysis
on smart toys, we only performed the security analysis
on toy Alpha. For the usability evaluation, since the
literature still lacks usability evaluation of privacy
issues on smart toys, we performed it on both toy Alpha
and Beta.

3.2. Material
We employed two smart toy technologies as a subject
for the experiments. We used the "Privacy not included"
website from Mozilla [35] to choose both smart toys. To
keep the anonymity of the brands and their privacy, we
refer to the technologies as toys Alpha and Beta. The
smart toy brands mentioned previously in various
sections of this work have no direct connection to toy
Alpha or Beta used in this section of our work. Toy
Alpha is a smart interactive toy that makes
conversations with kids. It is connected to a Cloudbased Artificial Intelligence machine for question
answering, which operates through Wi-Fi. The setting
of Alpha is made available with the free app, which is
available to be downloaded for Android or iOS-based
phones. For feasibility reasons, the Android-based
mobile app of the toys has been used throughout the case
study. The Web interface of Beta had input validation
errors such as Cross-Site Forgery Request and Persistent
XSS. Moreover, it uses unencrypted communication
channel HTTP instead of HTTPS to transmit sensitive
information. It also allows weak login credentials while
creating a user account. We employed toy Alpha for the
security analysis and one usability heuristic evaluation.
Beta is an internet-connected toy designed and
developed by a traditional toy company, and a
computing company focused on talking toys. It is aimed
to communicate with children, while all conversations
between Beta and the child are stored in the Cloud and
can be accessed or managed by parents on a dedicated
website. Toy Beta can be easily configured with the
application available to be downloaded for Android or
iOS-based phones on their app store. We employed toy
Beta for the second heuristic evaluation.

4. Results and Discussions
3.1. Participants
4.1. Security Analysis
Both the security analysis and usability evaluation were
carried out by experts. The security analysis was
conducted by two security experts (both Ph.D. students).
Meanwhile, the usability evaluation was an expert
review [34], conducted by two usability experts (a
usability researcher, Ph.D., and a Ph.D. student). To
conduct the usability evaluation of smart toys' privacy
controls, we considered the privacy controls as available
on current application markets. Due to time constraints,

The security analysis was based on both mobile and
Web/desktop versions of a smart toy privacy control. To
complement the analysis, we used the Wireshark [36]
tool to clearly check what happens in the toy connection
with the Cloud. The privacy vulnerabilities and their
impacts are indicated in Table 3.
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# Information Security
Vulnerability

Privacy Impact

1 Weak password

This vulnerability will allow
attackers to gain access to
users' accounts and all
private and sensitive
information about the user.
This security vulnerability
has not been resolved.

2 No Password Brute
Force Protections

3 Use of HTTP on the
password reset web
page (identified by
using Wireshark)

This vulnerability allows an
attacker to brute force user
passwords and infiltrate the
victim user account and gain
access to users' data. This
security vulnerability has
not been resolved.
If an attacker sniffs network
traffic when the user reset
its password, the attacker
would be able to access the
password reset page and
hijack the user's account. As
observed in our study, this
security vulnerability has
not been resolved yet.

review large audio conversation files
to identify a child's privacy breaches.
This may be effortful for them.
2

Excessive visibility for
recommended audios: Users may
only review recommended audio
conversation files because they are
on the principal page of the Web
application.

Heuristic #1—
Visibility of
activity status
[37]

3

Repetitive security tasks: There is
no clear way of identifying which
audio conversation files have
already been reviewed by users.

Heuristic #2—
History of
actions and
changes on
artifacts [37]

4

Poor visibility of privacy policies
after login: Right after login, users
are required to set up the child's
information and connect the toy.
During this task period, there is no
indication of privacy policies
("Provide rules and constraints"
[36]) if they need to review it.

Heuristic #4—
Rules and
constraints [37]

5

Lacking audio control: Users
cannot control the audio execution
("analyze historical information"
[36]). If they need to go to a specific
part of the audio, they must listen to
the entire audio until it.

Heuristic #2—
History of
actions and
changes on
artifacts [37]

6

Excessive deletion: Users unable to
delete parts of the file ("limit the
awareness" [36]) that may contain
sensitive information of the audio
conversation. Instead, they must
delete the entire audio.

Heuristic #1—
Visibility of
activity status
[37]

7

Poor keyboard navigation: Users
may face difficulties to navigate
using the keyboard ("allow the
incorporation of a workflow").

Heuristic #5—
Planning and
dividing work
between users
[37]

Table 3.Vulnerabilities and related Privacy Impact

Our analysis could only find the three vulnerabilities, as
listed in Table 3. Because all of these vulnerabilities
were previously identified in the literature, we assumed
that the set of vulnerabilities is saturated, and no further
analysis is necessary at the moment.

4.2. Heuristic Evaluation I
For the first heuristic evaluation, we evaluated the Web
browser-based application of privacy control for toy
Alpha. We adopted the heuristics of Jaferian et al. [37]
as usability criteria to inspect the privacy control. As
indicated in Salgado et al. [38], these are the most
appropriate usability heuristics for inspections of
parental privacy controls of smart toys. All of the
potential usable security vulnerabilities are new
(diagnosed in our study) and were not resolved yet.
They are described in Table 4.
#

Usability Problem (Information
Security Vulnerability)

Reference

1

No alternative audio description:
Users can only review the
conversation content by listening to
the audio files. Users may have to

Heuristic #1—
Visibility of
activity status
[37]

Table 4. Alpha - Usability Problem and Reference.

As indicated in Table 4, most (three out of seven) of the
usability problems relate to the Heuristic #1—Visibility
of activity status [37], followed by Heuristic #2—
History of actions and changes on artifacts [37] (two out
of seven). To some extent, this was expected because
usability heuristics are usually ordered according to its
explanatory power [39]. Although we could perform the
heuristic evaluation to identify the vulnerabilities, rating
a severity for the findings was not an easy task. Because
all of the issues are related to information security,
highly important to the application, we could not rate the
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severity of problems employing the traditional severity
scale as presented by Nielsen [40]. For this reason, in
Section 5, we recommend the use of a revised severity
scale, which we created to address the characteristics of
usability problems in privacy control tools.

14

Lacking cancelation of information
sharing: The app does not provide
an option to cancel (undo)
information sharing. After users
insert children's names and dates of
birth, there is no alternative to
cancel it before the app sends it to
the Cloud.

Heuristic #2—
History of
actions and
changes on
artifacts [37]

15

Lacking information about the
connection with mobile Artificial
Intelligence (AI) assistant: The app
offers a connection with mobile AI
assistance, but there is no clear
explanation of what information
the assistant can access.

Heuristic #1—
Visibility of
activity status
[37]

16

Menu lacking the option to manage
a child's information: The app asks
for both parents' and child's
information, but there is no
indication of where to manage the
child's information after its
insertion.

Heuristic #2—
History of
actions and
changes on
artifacts [37]

4.3. Heuristic Evaluation II
For the usable security evaluation of Toy Beta, we
adopted its free mobile app for iOS devices. As for
heuristic evaluation, We adopted the heuristics of
Jaferian et al. [36] as usability criteria to inspect the
usability of toy Beta privacy control. All of the potential
human vulnerabilities are new (diagnosed in our study)
and were not resolved yet. They are described in Table
5.
#

Usability Problem (Information
Security Vulnerability)

Reference

8

Lacking help with password
strength: There is no indication of
password strength while users are
creating it. This is necessary to
support the "freedom to choose
different paths that respect the
constraints" [37]

Heuristic #4—
Rules and
constraints [37]

9

Lacking indication of password
requirements: There is no
indication
of
password
requirements (e.g., number of
characters) while users are creating
it.

Heuristic #1—
Visibility of
activity status
[37]

10

Privacy Policy on the external
website: The app opens its privacy
policies on an external website
without
providing
any
advertisement in advance to users.

Heuristic #4—
Rules and
constraints [37]

11

Lacking visibility for the privacy
policy link: The privacy policy link
receives less visibility than account
information and the next button.
Because this is a sensitive app,
privacy policies should receive
more visibility.

Heuristic #4—
Rules and
constraints [37]

12

Confusing user profile creation:
The app does not indicate that the
account (being created) belongs to
the parents/guardians and not to
their children.

Heuristic #5—
Planning and
dividing work
between users
[37]

13

Lacking privacy notice: The app
does not inform users when
sensitive child information is being
sent to the Cloud.

Heuristic #1—
Visibility of
activity status
[37]

Table 5. Beta- Usability Problem and Reference.

As one can see, we diagnosed two times more usability
problems with the privacy control of toy Beta in
comparison with toy Alpha. This fact does not mean that
the privacy control of toy Beta is worse than the privacy
control of toy Alpha. As we understand, this is due to
the fact that toy Beta provides privacy control with more
information about privacy policies. On the one hand, it
is important to provide all the necessary information for
users about their information privacy. On the other
hand, this may implicate more problems related to
Heuristic #4—Rules and constraints [37]. As indicated
by Table 5, most of the problems found were related to
the Heuristic #4—Rules and constraints (three out of
nine problems) or to the Heuristic #1—Visibility of
activity status (three out of nine problems). From these
findings, we raise the question if privacy controls with
more policy descriptions are prone to more situations
that may contradict the Heuristic #4—Rules and
constraints. Future research can investigate this topic.
As in the heuristic evaluation of toy Alpha, the second
most preferred heuristic in this evaluation was also
Heuristic #2—History of actions and changes on
artifacts. It seems that The first two heuristics of
Jaferian et al. [37] are, indeed, those with the highest
explanatory power, justifying the order of heuristics.
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5. Recommendations for the Design of
Usable Privacy Controls
In this work, we list nine information security
vulnerabilities. Six out of these nine vulnerabilities are
retrieved from the literature, while the other three were
identified by us in this work. These vulnerabilities are
not usability related and motivate us to recommend
attention for further development of smart toy privacy
controls by means of: (i) do not use HTTP for
transferring sensitive information; (ii) validate and
sanitize input to avoid Cross-Site Scripting (XSS); (iii)
require encrypted Wi-Fi; (iv) protect against remote
brute force attacks on users' passwords; and (v) require
authentication prior to privacy control.
Although these recommendations are important, we
are not the first to reinforce the importance of them since
they are mostly based on the literature. On the contrary,
all the 16 human vulnerabilities discussed in this study
comes from our study. From these findings, we raised
the question if privacy controls with more policy
descriptions are prone to more situations that may
contradict the Heuristic #4—Rules and constraints.
Future research can investigate this topic. From these
vulnerabilities, we suggest recommendations to
improve the usability of smart toy privacy controls.
These recommendations are a result of applying the
heuristics of Jaferian et al. [37] in the heuristic
evaluations of this study. We present the
recommendations in Table 6, along with its sources,
which are the usability problems, as numbered (#) in
tables 4 and 5, that justify the recommendations.
Recommendation

Usability
Problem (#)

Provide alternatives to efficiently perceive
privacy controls. Users should not be
obligated to interact with privacy controls
by audio if they find the text more efficient
to review information.

#1

Perception of control over the perception
of information: The main focus of privacy
controls should be on providing the
perception of the control instead of
providing the perception of the
information collected. Users should not
perceive excessive information competing
with control options.

#2

Apply the Heuristic #2—History of
actions and changes on artifacts [36] to
provide users with the perception of which
information is in accordance with users'
control preferences.

#3

Provide privacy policies access at every
screen and keep them consistent with the
interface design.

#4, #10

Provide flexible controls. Users should be
able to opt for fine-grained controls, such
as deleting specific sections of the audio.

#5, #6

Provide efficient controls, such as
supporting keyboard navigation for
experienced users.

#7

Nudge users towards the creation of
strong passwords.

#8, #9

Provide privacy notices about ongoing
data sharing.

#11, #13

Clearly distinguish settings for children's
information from parent's (or legal
guardians') information. This is due to
the need to provide information about the
child, who is the smart toy user, and
parents (or legal guardians) for
authentication in the privacy control.

#12, #16

Provide clearly indicated alternatives to
undo unwanted data sharing. This is to
mitigate the consequences of laypeople
giving wrong consents. Although this
seems impossible, because we cannot
affirm that the data has not been seen by
anyone else, provide ways to request data
deletion from a third party.

#14

Provide efficient control connection with
artificial intelligence assistants. Users
should know what information the
assistant can access, and voice interactions
should be human-like conversations.

#15

Table 6. Recommendations to Enhance Usability and
Privacy of Smart Toys.

In the growing market of smart toys, security gets
critical as users may be children and novices to the cyber
world hidden behind the attractive toys. Because of the
sensitive nature of children's personal information, a toy
manufacturing company should design smart connected
toys with security as a priority. Investment in robust
security and continued updates to security measures are
critical. Toy manufacturing companies should also
apply acceptable data privacy practices such as a
collection of only data that is required for the main
operations of the smart toy and to retain collected
information for the only limited time that is necessary
with valid reasoning. Our recommendations aim to
support companies in the design process for better smart
toy privacy controls.
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In addition to our recommendations, and based on
our experience with the case studies, we understand that
a new severity rating scale is necessary to fully indicate
the severity of usable privacy problems. We need a
severity rating scale that represents privacy implications
in it, along with usability issues. For this reason, we
adapted Nielsen's severity scale [40] to suggest the new
usable privacy severity scale:
1. Cosmetic: usability problems, not related to policy
generation/agreement, that may not stop users from
using the interface.
2. Minor: usability problems, not related to policy
generation/agreement, that may stop users from
using the interface
3. Major: This leads to generating a wrong policy.
4. Catastrophe: leads to agreeing with the wrong
policy.
Although new, our severity scale is based on
Nielsen's [40] traditional severity scale. This might
influence practical aspects of employing our new scale
because it keeps the span of four levels and lean
descriptions. Nevertheless, future studies are still
necessary to validate our severity scale in empirical
experiments.
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